7 December 1950

MEMORANDUM TO DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

- 1. Representative Boykin wanted you to see the attached letter. It is possible that he will be telephoning you, although I hope I have taken this matter off your hands.
- 2. I shall advise you orally of my conversations with him and his Chinese friends.
- 3. I have a copy of the Boykin letter, so do not bother to return.

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Attachment (1)

DOCUMENT NO. 2
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7-3953 COMMITTEE: MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES

HOME ADDRESS: MOBILE, ALABAMA

ALPHONSE LUCAS SECRETARY

Congress of the United States House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

December 5, 1950

Honorable Sidney W. Souers The White House Washington, D. C.

My dear Admiral Souers:

Referring to my long distance telephone conversation with you in Atlanta last night, I take the following line of reasoning:

From the latest developments in Korea as well as by events in Europe since 1945, we at last realize that the Gospel according to Saint Lenin was meant by the Communists in all seriousness, that either the Democracies or Communism must go down, that they cannot co-exist.

Equally, we now realize that the Chinese Communists are not a bunch of "Agrarian Reformers," but they are the stooges of Soviet Russia, who released thirty G.I.'s with good treatment one day, and on the next day, after their victory, doused gasoline over our wounded boys and burned them.

A crisis has come to our Country, the like of which has never before been experienced. We ought to think objectively and form an overall picture of what we should do all over the world, if we are to come out of it alive. They talk of a deal with the Chinese Communists, whereby in giving them recognition in the United Nations they would permit us to keep South Korea. That is reward for aggression. Why should we submit to this humiliation of being permitted to retain South Korea and give an equal voice in the Security Council of the United Nations to the Chinese Communist aggressors?

If we can keep South Korea by our own strength without too much cost, well and good; but if necessary, let us give it up for the time being. There is no disgrace in it, there is no loss of prestige. It is a display not of weakness, but of strength, and firmness of purpose. We are going to fight the enemy, not at his

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Honorable Sidney W. Souers - 2 - December 5, 1950

most convenient spot, but to fight him where we are superior. During the last war under the force of enemy local superiority we gave up the Philippines, didn't we? But we got it back, and that's what counts.

Why do we pull out of Korea? It is in order to strengthen our outer ramparts, Japan, Okinawa, Formosa and the Philippines. If we were to give up any of this chain of Islands, we would lose our outer bastions and fall back on a defensive warfare basing on the Continental United States with Hawaii as an Outpost. In addition, there is one highly important consideration for the coming long, drawn out struggle in which our existence is staked — the question of manpower. Besides Russia and China the Soviet bloc has the manpower of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria.

In addition to our own strength there are two fighting stocks we could draw upon, the Germans and the Japanese. The Chinese masses have been over run by the Communists. We shall eventually have them on our side, but only at a later time.

We want Western Europe because we want their industrial potentials, and we want the manpower of Germany. We want to do everything we can to protect Western Europe and have it on our side. There is every reason why we should strengthen our European defenses. But we shall do it with our eyes open. We shall have as our Allies, France which is Communists ridden, and an Ally whose Chief of General Staff last year betrayed her to the Indo-China Communists, We have twentyfive percent of the population there Communists. We have a France which shortsightedly refused to recognize the real present danger of Soviet Russia and instead is afraid of the bogey of future German strength. We have Italy whose industrial population is largely Communist. Defend Western Europe we must, but we can have no illusions; it is not going to be an easy task with France and Italy as they are, and with the rest of the potential Allies such as they are. We must not be blind to the fact that despite everything we do, we might have to lose Western Europe.

But on the other side of the world with our superiority in the Air and in the Sea and with the undying hatred of the Japs against the Russians, our task of holding our Western Bastions would be easy. Bring everyone of our G.I.'s now in Korea into Germany and they may not be able to count against the one hundred and seventy five Russian Divisions besides their satellite strength. But let these men go to Japan, under the cover of our sea power and air power, we can hold Japan, Okinawa, Formosa and the Philippines inviolate.

From now on we shall arm and arm to the teeth, and when we are thoroughly ready, we can choose our own Theatre of Operations, just as our enemy has chosen it this time.

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Honorable Sidney W. Souers - 3 - December 5, 1950

In the meantime, from our Pacific ramparts, we can strike back at the Chinese Communists by guerilla warfare, by sabotage, and if necessary by air bombing and by blockade to keep them from consolidation, until we are strong enough to move either in Europe or on the mainland of Asia.

We will not recognize the Chinese Communists in the United Nations. It would be better if the United Nations were dissolved rather than to have aggression rewarded. When the Japs conquered Manchuria in 1932, we steadfastly held on to the principle of non-recognition of aggression. We were not strong enough to fight Japan then, at least we were not ready, but we upheld the moral law which is the basis of our democratic society, and in the end, we prevailed.

Let us be done with illusions, let us find the lowest common denominators of our strength and build from there on. Only thus we can protect the United States, and with it the hope of Democracy the World over.

Warm personal regards, I am

Sincerely your friend,

Frank W. Boykin. M. C.

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